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ABSTRACT
Microbial pathogens and pesticide residues in food pose a financial burden to society which
can be reduced by incurring costs to reduce these food safety risks. We explore three
valuation techniques that place a monetary value on food safety risk reductions, and we
present a case study for each: a contingent valuation survey on pesticide residues, an
experimentalauction marketfor a chicken sandwich with reduced risk of Salmonella, and
a cost-of-illness analysis for seven foodborne pathogens. Estimates from these techniques
can be used in costhenefit analyses for policies that reduce food safety risks.
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The food supply in the United States is gen-
erally considered healthy, nutritious, and safe.
However, the modern industrial food system
may result in undesired or unanticipated out-
comes that pose a health hazard for consum-
ers. The Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) estimate that, based on
reported outbreaks and other epidemiologic
data, between 6.5 and 33 million people in the
United States become ill from microbial
pathogens in their food each year (i.e., bacte-
ria, parasites, viruses, and fungi); of these, up
to 9,000 die (Council for Agricultural Science
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and Technology). Archer and Kvenberg esti-
mate that 2–3 % of these foodborne illness
cases develop secondary illnesses or compli-
cations such as arthritis following some Sal-
monella infections. Pesticide and other farm
chemical residues may remain on fruits and
vegetables, and prolonged dietary exposure to
such chemicals may pose a risk of cancer or
other adverse health effects (particularly to
children), although evidence suggests that
these risks are fairly low (Kuchler et al.). In
recent years, there have been some highly
publicized outbreaks of foodborne illnesses
linked to a variety of foods. In the summer of
1997, 25 million pounds of hamburger poten-
tially contaminated with E. coli O 157:H7 were
recalled. News stories about foodborne disease
have been widespread, contributing to rising
public concern about the problem.
Consumers make choices about the food
products they buy based on a number of fac-
tors. In addition to the price of the product,
factors such as appearance, convenience, tex-
ture, smell, and perceived quality influence70 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
choices made in the marketplace. In an ideal
world, consumers would make consumption
decisions with full information about product
attributes, and so choose the foods that max-
imize their well-being. In the real world, there
are numerous food-safety information prob-
lems which complicate the consumer’s deci-
sion making. For example, all raw meat and
poultry products contain some level of microo-
rganisms, some of which may be pathogens.
However, consumers generally do not know
the level of foodborne-illness risk, since
pathogens are not visible to the naked eye.
Aside from some rather obvious indications
(e.g., unpleasant odor or discoloration, both of
which may be caused by nonpathogenic spoil-
age microorganisms), there are, in many cases,
no clear-cut ways for consumers to determine
if there is a health risk from pathogens or other
causes (e.g., pesticide residues).
While producers have some information
about how safe their product is, such as infor-
mation about the chemicals used during pro-
duction or the care taken during butchering of
meat, there is no incentive to share that infor-
mation with consumers. This is because it is
difficult to charge a premium for the unob-
servable increase in safety. This asymmetry in
information about food safety between pro-
ducers and consumers leads to a market fail-
ure. The workings of a nonregulated market
may yield greater-than-optimal levels of
pathogens and farm chemicals in the food sup-
ply and excessive human-health risk, which
could in turn result in higher levels of illness
and mortality. In such a case, the public wel-
fare could be enhanced if society regulated the
food industry to reduce the level of foodborne
health risks and/or increase consumers’
knowledge so they can take personal actions
to reduce their risk of exposure to foodborne
illness.
The economic issue of concern is how best
to achieve the goal of a safer food supply. Al-
though regulations governing food production,
processing, distribution, and marketing may
create benefits by increasing the safety level
of the nation’s food supply (i.e., reducing risk
of illness), these regulations also can increase
producers’ costs and potentially raise food
prices. The task is to ensure that the regula-
tions maximize the net benefits of increasing
food safety, that is, equating the marginal ben-
efits of safer food with the marginal costs of
achieving food safety goals.
Faced with the task of estimating benefits
where there is market failure or an externality
problem, economists have developed several
measurement techniques for nonmarket goods,
and these techniques fall into two general
classes. The first class of techniques values
changes in social welfare by using indirect ev-
idence from the marketplace such as the in-
dividual’s expenditures on related goods and
services. One such technique is the cost-of-
illness approach. Estimates from this approach
can be used as a proxy for a change in expen-
ditures and foregone wages associated with a
change in ill-health episodes caused by a spe-
cific health risk. Other market-based tech-
niques rely on observed market choices that
reveal preferences for a nonmarket good, such
as the travel cost method for estimating rec-
reation benefits and the averting expenditure
method for estimating values of health risks
from environmental hazards. The second class
of techniques consists of those that use stated
preferences about nonmarket goods. The most
widely used of these is contingent valuation.
Falling in between these two classes are ex-
perimental market techniques, where individ-
ual choices made in constructed market situ-
ations reveal preferences for a good that
usually cannot be directly purchased in the
market, We characterize experimental markets
as intermediate between market-based tech-
niques and stated preference techniques be-
cause the choice situation is artificially creat-
ed—but the choices are real, not hypothetical.
In this paper, we explore three valuation
techniques that are used to measure the ben-
efits of food safety risk reductions, and we
present a case study for each: (a) a contingent
valuation survey on pesticide residues, (b) an
experimental auction market for a chicken
sandwich with reduced risk of Salmonella, and
(c) a cost-of-illness analysis for foodborne
pathogens. Estimates from these techniques
can be used in cost/benefit analyses for poli-
cies that reduce food safety risks.Buzby et al.: Measuring Consumer Benefits
Contingent Valuation Methods
Contingent valuation (CV) methods include
telephone surveys, mail surveys, and personal
interviews that elicit consumers’ willingness
to pay (WTP) for nonmarket goods “contin-
gent” on a given hypothetical scenario. In this
hypothetical decision situation, the respondent
is willing to pay some money to obtain a level
of provision of a nonmarket or public good.
In the past few decades, over 1,600 contingent
valuation and related publications have mea-
sured the benefits of a variety of nonmarket
goods (Carson et al.).
CV surveys have been increasingly used to
measure consumers’ WTP for food safety risk
reductions. CV surveys have elicited consum-
ers’ WTP for reduced risk from: toxins in
shellfish (Lin and Milon), nitrates in drinking
water (Crutchfield, Cooper, and Hellerstein),
and Salmonella in chicken and eggs (Henson).
Another survey elicited consumers’ WTP for
leaner pork produced with porcine somatotro-
pin (pST), a naturally occurring protein which
some consumers feel poses a food safety risk
(Halbrendt et al.). CV surveys have focused
on risk reductions from pesticides in food and
have estimated the value of organic produce,
certified pesticide residue-free produce, or
produce with other pesticide risk reductions.
Of these pesticide surveys, several have esti-
mated consumers’ WTP for food that is “ saf-
er” but that does not have a specified risk re-
duction (Weaver, Evans, and Luloffi Misra,
Huang, and Ott; Ott). Other CV pesticide sur-
veys have estimated WTP for specific risk re-
ductions (Buzby, Ready, and Skees; van Rav-
enswaay and Hoehn). The case study
presented here contributes to this foundation
by eliciting consumers’ WTP for two different
specified risk reductions.
A Contingent Valuation Study Valuing Food
Safety
The contingent choice scenario used in the CV
survey was designed to reveal WTP for a re-
duction in exposure to pesticide residues on
fresh produce. The respondents were told that
they must shop for groceries at either Store A
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or Store B. These two stores were described
as being similar to the stores where the re-
spondents currently shop, with the exception
of the fresh produce. TWO survey versions
were used (I and II). In both survey versions,
Store A does not test any of its fresh produce
for pesticide residues. Store A therefore rep-
resents the typical situation found in most U.S.
grocery stores. In survey version I, Store B
tests all of its fresh produce and rejects any
that does not meet government standards for
pesticide residues (this store is denoted here as
the “government standards” store). In survey
version II, Store B tests all of its fresh produce
and rejects any with detectable pesticide resi-
dues (this store is denoted here as the “pesti-
cide-free” store). Thus, shopping at Store B
reduces or eliminates the amount of pesticide
residues to which the consumer is exposed.
Apart from this difference, and the associated
difference in price, Store A and Store B were
described as being identical in all respects, and
the produce sold was described as being iden-
tical in appearance, freshness, and taste.
Prior to the description of the store-choice
scenario, respondents were asked their own
subjective belief about the mortality risk from
consuming fresh produce from a store like
Store A. A visual risk ladder, similar to that
used by Loomis and Duvair, showed mortality
risks from several more-familiar causes of
death, including for example car accidents, ac-
cidental falls, lightning, and meteorites. The
position of each risk on the ladder was deter-
mined by the actual number of deaths caused
by that risk each year, per 1 million individ-
uals. These numerical risk estimates also were
presented to the respondents, next to the risk
ladder. Respondents were asked to rate the
mortality risk from pesticide residues on fresh
produce as compared to these causes of death,
with the answer coded as an index varying
from 1–19 (with 1 = lower than the risk of
death from a meteorite, and 19 = higher than
the risk of death from a car accident). Later in
the survey, during description of the store-
choice scenario, respondents were given ob-
jective estimates of the mortality risk from
cancer caused by pesticide residues on fresh
uroduce. For Store A. this was given as one .72 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
death per 1 million people per year. In survey
version I, shopping at the “government stan-
dards” store reduced that risk by one-half. In
survey version II, shopping at the “pesticide-
free” store eliminated the risk completely.
In both versions, respondents were told that
Store B was more expensive than Store A,
with the weekly difference in cost between the
two stores set at one of seven different levels:
$1, $3, $5, $8, $10, $15, and $25. Respon-
dents were reminded that this decision would
have no impact on other mortality risks, and
were told that cancer caused by pesticide res-
idues on fresh produce probably accounts for
less than 1Yo of all cancer cases. Respondents
were asked two valuation questions in se-
quence. First, they were asked at which store
they would shop, given the price difference.
Next they were asked the maximum amount
they would pay to shop at Store B. Thus, both
a dichotomous-choice and an open-ended
WTP response were elicited from each re-
spondent.
To answer the dichotomous-choice valua-
tion question, respondents are assumed to
choose the store that yields higher utility. We
model this utility as:
and
where X, is a vector of variables describing
both individual Z and Store B, P, is the price
differential between the two stores faced by
individual Z, and e? and # are individual-spe-
cific random errors, which we assume follow
type I extreme value distribution, so that the
parameters @ and y can be estimated using a
logit regression. Two forms of f(P,) were in-
vestigated empirically, a linear form and the
translocated log form, ln(Pi + 1). The trans-
location was set at one so that the price term
would vanish as the price differential goes to
zero.
Because E; and e? are not observable, the
price that sets U: and U: equal is not known
for an individual. However, it is possible to
calculate the price that sets expected utility
from the two stores equal. For the linear form
of f(Pi), that price is –X,~/y. For the trans-
located log form, that price is exp(–Xi~/y) –
1. This price also corresponds to the median
compensating variation for the risk reduction
across a population of similar individuals.
The Contingent Valuation Survey and Results
The Survey
The survey was administered by mail. A total
of 1,800 surveys were mailed out in three
waves of 600 each. Addresses were purchased
from a commercial mailing list vender. The
waves went out in November 1994, February
1995, and May 1995. Each wave followed the
Dillman total design method, with a notifica-
tion letter, a survey packet, a reminder post-
card, and a second survey packet to nonres-
pondents. For the first two waves, all mailings
were sent by first-class post. Of these 1,200
surveys, 161 (or 13.4%) were returned as un-
deliverable or deceased. Of the remaining, 439
were returned, giving an effective response
rate of 42.3%. Due to a miscommunication,
the third wave of 600 surveys was mailed by
bulk-rate post. These had a similar rate of un-
deliverable addresses (13.390), but a lower re-
sponse rate. A total of 188 surveys were re-
turned from the third-wave mailing, for an
effective response rate of 36.1 Yo. While the
low response rate in the third wave is unfor-
tunate, the incidence of additional nonres-
ponse due to the use of bulk rate did not ap-
pear to be correlated with preferences for food
safety. A dummy variable for survey wave
(wave 3 versus waves 1 and 2) was not sig-
nificantly related to the response to the valu-
ation question (CY> 0.30).
There was wide variability in subjective
belief about the danger posed by pesticide res-
idues on fresh produce. Four percent of re-
spondents thought that pesticide residues
cause more deaths each year than do auto-
mobile accidents, while 17?Z0thought that they
caused fewer deaths than do meteorites. The
median risk index value was 5, which corre-
sponds to a numerical risk of three deaths perBuzby et al.: Measuring Consumer Benejits ’73
million people per year. The mean risk index
value was 13.2, which roughly translates to 14
deaths per million people per year. However,
translating the risk index values to numerical
risks, and then averaging gives roughly 43
deaths per million per year. The skewed nature
of the risk index values, and the nonlinear re-
lationship between the risk index and numer-
ical risk estimates make it difficult to charac-
terize the central tendency of subjective
beliefs. Nevertheless, it can be stated that most
respondents believe the risk to be larger than
expert assessments.
Of the 627 returned surveys from the three
mailing waves, 22 did not contain a usable
valuation response. An additional nine were
judged to be protest responses, based on a stat-
ed zero WTP for safer food, along with agree-
ment with the statement, “I am concerned
about pesticides, but I refuse to pay more for
food to avoid them.” This left 596 usable sur-
veys for estimation purposes: 289 version I,
and 307 version II. The rate of usable re-
sponses did not differ significantly across the
two survey versions.
Contingent Valuation Survey Results
In order to avoid the effects of possible yea-
saying, responses to the valuation questions
were interpreted conservatively. Ready, Buz-
by, and Hu observed that mail survey respon-
dents sometimes contradict themselves when
asked both a dichotomous-choice and an open-
ended question, and viewed these contradic-
tions as possible evidence of yea-saying be-
havior. For this study, a respondent was
judged to favor Store B only if she or he chose
that store in the first valuation question, and
then did not state an open-ended WTP less
than the price differential described in the con-
tingent-choice scenario. Thus, the elicitation
procedure is not a pure dichotomous choice,
but includes a consistency check. A total of
366 respondents (61.4%) chose Store B in the
initial valuation question. Of these, 101 con-
tradicted themselves in the open-ended follow-
up question.
A model predicting store choice was esti-
mated using logit regression. Explanatory
Table 1. Logit Regression Results of CV Re-
sponses
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
ln(l%-ice + 1) –1.441 9.49
Intercept 1.398 2.02
Pesticide-Free 0.1245 0.65
Risk Index 0,0742 3.72




Birth Year 0,0061 0.88
No. in Household –0.0254 0.26
Children in Household 0.487 1.63
variables in the regression included household
income, years of schooling completed by the
respondent, respondent’s sex (female = 1),
ethnicity (Caucasian = 1), year of birth (with
1900 = O), number of people living in the
household, whether the household contains
children under the age of 18, and the respon-
dent’s subjective rating of the mortality risk
from pesticide residues on fresh produce, as
measured by an index scaled from 1 to 19.
Missing data for individual variables were set
equal to sample means. A dummy variable for
survey version (version II = 1) was also in-
cluded in the regression.
The translocated log transformation of
price outperformed a linear-price model as
measured by model log-likelihood. Table 1
presents the parameter estimates for the trans-
located log model. Price differential was a sig-
nificant determinant of store choice, with high-
er price differentials favoring Store A, the
cheaper store. The regression results also
showed that respondents giving a higher sub-
jective risk rating, higher income respondents,
and females were more likely to choose Store
B. The first two findings would be expected;
the last is interesting but not required by the-
ory. The other demographic variables were not
significant, though there were some interesting
interactions, which we explore further below.
The coefficient on the dummy variable for sur-
vey version II was positive, as would be ex-
pected, but was not significant.
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Table 2. CV Estimates of Willingness to Pay per Week for Safer Produce ($)
%VO Confidence 95% Confidence
Store Type Median Interval Mean Interval
Government Standards 5.31 4.30 I 6.63 8.36 7.141 9.62
Pesticide-Free 5.88 4.81 I 7.24 8.91 7.69/ 10.20
for safer food are presented in table 2, along
with 95 Yo confidence intervals constructed by
the simulation method described by Krinsky
and Robb. We focus here on median WTP, as
it represents the price differential at which ex-
pected utility for the two stores is equal. For
an average individual (with Xi set at sample
means), that value is $5.31 per household per
week for the government standards store, and
$5.88 for the pesticide-free store. These two
values are not significantly different (t =
0.65). It is also of interest to investigate how
this value varies across individuals with dif-
ferent characteristics. For example, for a re-
spondent born in 1940, with no children at
home, the estimated WTP to shop at a store
that meets government standards is $4.49 per
week. For a respondent born in 1960, who
does have children at home, the estimated
WTP is $7.38, and the difference between
these two estimates is statistically significant
(t = 2.15). Thus, even though neither year of
birth nor presence of children is individually
significant, their joint contribution can be.
Discussion of the CV Results
Two related issues are of concern with the CV
results. First, the valuation responses are sta-
tistically insensitive to the size of the risk re-
duction associated with shopping at Store B,
although the direction of the difference fol-
lows the prediction of theory. Second, the
WTP values seem large relative to other em-
pirical estimates of the value of a mortality
risk reduction. Both of these results may be
related to respondents paying more attention
to the qualitative aspects of the scenario than
to the quantitative aspects.
Regarding the issue of the scope of the
safety improvement, it seems clear that re-
spondents either were unable to interpret and
process the quantitative information about the
risk reduction, or ignored that information. In
the two survey versions, switching to the store
that meets all government standards reduces
risks by one-half. Switching to the store with
no detectable residues completely eliminates
the risk. However, these risk estimates are con-
jectural. We were unable to locate a toxicol-
ogist who was willing to give such policy-spe-
cific estimates. It may well be that meeting all
government standards reduces the risk essen-
tially to zero. If respondents believe this, then
they may not see any benefit from going to a
store that employs even stricter criteria.
With regard to the size of the WTP values,
some simple math shows that these numbers
are big relative to the risks. From these num-
bers, the value of a premature death is calcu-
lated at either $204 million (using the value
for the store that meets government standards)
or $113 million (using the value for the store
that has no detectable residues). Either esti-
mate far exceeds common estimates from
studies that look at wage differentials associ-
ated with job risk (e.g., $3–$7 million, ac-
cording to Viscusi). However, it may be that
respondents did not believe our posited mor-
tality risk of one out of 1 million persons per
year. The mean subjective risk given by re-
spondents was 43 deaths per 1 million people
per year. Using this risk estimate gives an es-
timated value of a premature death of either
$4.8 or $2.6 million. These figures are more
consistent with previous estimates of the value
of a premature death.
Unfortunately, we cannot give guidance on
which set of values is more correct for our
respondents, or whether their value lies some-
where in between. At a minimum, we must
question our ability to impose a detailed hy-
pothetical scenario that differs quantitatively
from the beliefs held by respondents. Our re-Buzby et al.: Measuring Consumer Benejits 75
suits are consistent with respondents who be-
lieve that: (a) therisk from pesticide residues
on fresh produce sold in atypical store is fair-
ly large, and (b) if all government regulations
are met, that risk is effectively eliminated. Un-
der those assumptions, the estimated value of
a premature death is $2.6 million, which falls
within the range of available estimates from
other studies.
Experimental Auction Markets
Food safety is, as described above, a nonmar-
ket good primarily because of high informa-
tion costs and/or asymmetry. Contingent val-
uation of food safety overcomes the
information problem by providing objective
assessments of health risk. Valuation of food
safety in experimental markets attempts to go
one step further-eliminating the information-
al deficiency and placing the good in some-
thing akin to a market situation where money
changes hands. Application of experimental
valuation to food safety is relatively new. The
first published studies originate from authors
at Iowa State University in the 1990s (Shin et
al.; Shogren et al.; Fox et al. 1995; Hayes et
al.). The technique has been applied to a num-
ber of other food characteristics including
pork attributes (Melton et al.), reductions in
pesticide risk (Roosen et al.), and the use of
bovine growth hormone in milk production
(Fox).
Advantages of Experimental Markets
Regardless of how well a contingent valuation
survey is designed and executed, participants
are still aware that they are valuing a hypo-
thetical scenario. The absence of market dis-
cipline (i.e., a budget constraint) can create an
environment conducive to questionable re-
sponses, and the literature contains several ex-
amples of inconsistencies such as lack of re-
sponsiveness to the scope and scale of
benefits. In our contingent valuation case
study, we found some evidence of scope in-
sensitivity and some inconsistencies between
the discrete-choice and open-ended values.
Valuation in the lab offers some advantages
in valuing food safety risk reductions. First,
experimental markets feature real monetary
payments, forcing respondents to consider
their budget constraints. Second, revelation of
truthful values is encouraged through a re-
quirement to consume one of the “risky”
products being valued and through the use of
an incentive-compatible auction mechanism.
The auction mechanism typically used is the
Vickrey second-price auction in which the
highest bidder obtains the product being auc-
tioned for a price equal to the second-highest
bid. By first participating in a candy bar auc-
tion, participants are familiarized with the pro-
cedure and learn that truthful revelation of val-
ue is the dominant strategy. A third potential
advantage is that selection bias directly related
to the good can be minimized by recruiting
for a “generic consumer study.”
There is some debate regarding the use of
single- or repeated-trial experimental auctions.
With repeated trials, participants are informed
up front that only one of a number of rounds
of bidding will be binding. Repeated trials
with market feedback allow individuals the
opportunity to appraise their own preferences
and beliefs in light of the information gener-
ated by the market. However, proponents of a
one-shot design argue that repetition may af-
fect the incentive-compatible properties of the
second-price auction because it allows for the
development of intra-group competition. An
advantage of repetition is that it allows for the
injection of new information (e.g., about risk),
and examination of its effect on values. One
study suggests that repetition does not result
in significant bias (Roosen et al.) but, at this
point, no compelling evidence exists to prefer
one approach over the other. The laboratory
setting accommodates both approaches, but a
repeated valuation exercise would be unreal-
istic in a survey setting.
Limitations of Experimental Markets
Obvious limitations on experimental valuation
are the higher costs per respondent and the
necessary geographic restrictions on samples.
The time commitment required of subjects is
substantially greater than that for a survey,76 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
thereby requiring some level of financial com-
pensation to reduce sample selection effects.
It is possible, of course, that participation pay-
ments may affect revealed values—an issue
we address below. Another limitation com-
pared to surveys is that, at least up until now,
experiments have been restricted to valuing
deliverable goods.
Finally, the experimental environment is
artificial and contrived, but no more so than
the hypothetical scenario presented in a sur-
vey. In fact, since external distractions are
eliminated in the laboratory, respondents can
give undivided attention to the valuation issue.
Given the potential benefits and limitations, it
appears that experimental valuation can best
be used as a complement to the survey meth-
od. In this context, Fox et al. (1998) describe
the use of an experiment as a means of cali-
brating hypothetical survey values.
An Experimental Auction Market Valuing
Food Safety
Methodology
In this study, we elicit willingness-to-pay val-
ues for reductions in Salmonella risk from a
sample of 50 undergraduate students at Kansas
State University. The procedure replicates the
experiments described in Fox et al. (1995),
and is identical in all respects except for: (a)
the level of payment to participants; (b) the
simultaneous valuation, in one treatment, of a
second good; and (c) the use of 10 repeated
trials instead of 20. Subjects were enrolled in
an agricultural marketing class, and the exper-
iment was conducted during a class period to
facilitate reduced payment of subjects without
involving significant participation bias effects.
The experiment had three parts. In part one,
identification numbers were assigned and de-
mographic information collected. In part two,
subjects participated in a candy bar auction
with repeated trials in order to learn the pro-
cedure and the incentive for truth revelation.
In part three, participants were endowed with
a Type I chicken sandwich and allowed to bid
for an upgrade to a Type II chicken sandwich.
The following descriptions were provided:
l Type I: This food has a typical chance of
being contaminated with the foodborne
pathogen Salmonella; i.e., ithas been pur-
chased from a local source.
l Type II: This food has been subject to strin-
gent screening for Salmonella. There is a
one in 1 million chance of getting salmo-
nellosis from consuming this food.
Following the fifth trial, additional infor-
mation was provided that described symptoms
of salmonellosis and informed participants that
the odds of contracting salmonellosis from
their typical Type I sandwich was one in
137,000. Following the tenth trial, a drawing
determined the binding trial. The highest bid-
der in the binding trial paid the appropriate
price to exchange his/her Type I sandwich for
the Type II—then all participants consumed
their sandwiches.
Participants were allocated at random to
one of four groups, each with 12 or 13 indi-
viduals. Each group represented one replica-
tion within a 2 X 2 treatment matrix. The
treatments were: (a) level of payment—$0 or
$3, and (b) the introduction of simultaneous
bidding for a second good—an upgrade from
a plain pencil to a KSU souvenir pencil. Here,
we will focus on the sensitivity of values to
the participation payment. Note that in the ex-
periments reported in Fox et al. (1995), all
participants were paid $18.
Experimental Auction Results
Figure 1 shows the average bid at each of the
10 trials for Groups 1 and 2 in which partic-
ipants bid only for safer chicken. On average,
the mean bid is 25c higher for the group re-
ceiving the $3 payment. This difference is sig-
nificant at the 10% level in trials 5, 7, and 8,
and at the 1YO level in trials 9 and 10. Simi-
larly, for Groups 3 and 4 in which participants
simultaneously bid for the pencil upgrade, the
average bid was, on average, 17@ higher for
the group receiving the payment, but the dif-
ference was significant only in trial 2 at the
10% level. Differences in the mean bid were
not significant in the first trial. Using the trial







Figure 1. Comparison of average bids for a reduction in Salmonella risk
is explained by participant characteristics
(gender, having had food poisoning) and treat-
ment effects (payment, bidding on a second
good), the coefficient on payment is positive
(~ = O.11) but not significant (t = 1.18). How-
ever, using the average bid over trials 8, 9, and
10 as the dependent variables shows a positive
(~ = 0.28) and statistically significant (t =
2.56) effect for the $3 payment.
Since our sample is small and nonrandom,
we cannot conclude with any reasonable de-
gree of confidence that payment results in an
upward bias. It is certainly possible that other
unobserved differences in participant charac-
teristics account in part for the difference in
bid levels. In the original study, Fox et al.
(1995) reported bids for the same reduction in
Salmonella risk for four groups of undergrad-
uate students. In the final trials of those ex-
periments, the average bid for groups in Ar-
kansas and Massachusetts exceeded $1,
significantly greater than the approximately
$0.55 average bids of groups in Iowa and Cal-
ifornia. Those differences could not be attrib-
uted to payment level since all participants re-
ceived $18.
It is also important to note that, since our
experiment was conducted during a class pe-
riod, our subjects had zero opportunity cost for
participating. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
hypothesize that they may have been likely to
regard their $3 payment as “found money. ”
Conversely, subjects recruited
eral population may be more
from the gen-
likely to view
payment as compensation for expenses in-
curred. In that context, it remains an open
question as to whether or not payment influ-
ences bids. If future studies find that it does,
researchers may need to rely on alternative
methods of compensation (e.g., charitable do-
nations on the subject’s behalf) which may be
less likely to affect values.
Focusing on our quantitative results, we
note that the average informed bid (over trials
6–10) for Salmonella risk reduction for indi-
viduals receiving the $3 payment was $0.54,
very similar to that of the Iowa and California
groups mentioned above. For participants re-
ceiving no payment, the average informed bid
was $0.32.
Cost-of-Illness Analysis Technique
The cost-of-illness technique has been used to
obtain partial estimates of annual costs of acute
foodborne illnesses and select secondary com-
plications by estimating the present value of
lifetime medical costs and lost productivity
(i.e., lost income and household production
caused by the illness) (Buzby et al.). Although
cost-of-illness analyses are less supported by
economic theory than are contingent valuation
and experimental auction techniques, they have
been useful in food safety policy making. A78 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
case in point is the Food Safety and Inspection
Service’s (FSIS’S) Pathogen Reduction/Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)
system regulation for federally inspected meat
and poultry slaughter and processing plants
(“Pathogen Reduction . . . ,“ Federal Register)
that used cost-of-illness estimates to represent
the benefits of the rule, as did the seafood
HACCP rule (“Procedures for Safe and Sani-
tary Processing . . . ,“ Federal Register).
Estimating the Costs of Foodborne Illness
and Premature Death
Cost-of-Illness Estimates
Cost-of-illness estimates are calculated from
the number of annual foodborne-illness cases
and deaths; the number of cases that develop
secondary complications; and the correspond-
ing medical costs, lost productivity costs, and
other illness-specific costs, such as special ed-
ucation and residential-care costs. In this case
study, for each foodborne illness, cases were
divided into four severity groups: (a) those
who did not visit a physician, (b) those who
visited a physician, (c) those who were hos-
pitalized, and (d) those who died prematurely
because of their illness. For some of the patho-
gens, a fifth severity group was used for pa-
tients who develop select secondary compli-
cations from the acute illness. For each
severity group, medical costs were estimated
for physician and hospital services, supplies,
medications, and special procedures unique to
treating the particular foodborne illnesses.
Such costs reflect the number of days/treat-
ments of a medical service, the average cost
per service/treatment, and the number of pa-
tients receiving such service/treatment.
Most people with foodborne illnesses miss
only one or two days of work. This lost pro-
ductivity is approximated by wage rates, pub-
lished by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. How-
ever, some patients die and some develop
complications that prevent them from ever re-
turning to work. The total cost of lost produc-
tivity is the sum for all individuals affected,
including the patients and, in the case of ill
children, their parents or paid caretakers.
Calculating the Value of a Premature Death
We used two different approaches as proxies
for the foregone earnings of someone who dies
prematurely or who is unable to ever return to
work because of his/her foodborne illness (ta-
ble 3). The first approach focuses primarily on
lost productivity using a combination of human
capital and WTP estimates developed by Lan-
defeld and Seskin. Human-capital estimates are
the value in today’s dollars of an individual’s
lifetime stream of income if the illness had not
occurred. The human capital estimates are in-
creased by a multiplier that captures people’s
WTP to avoid death, as reflected in life insur-
ance premiums. These estimates of the value of
a premature death range, depending on age,
from roughly $15,000 to $2,037,000 (in 1996
dollars). The major limitation of this approach
is that it does not fully consider the value that
individuals may place on (and pay for) feeling
healthy, avoiding pain and suffering, or using
their free time. Because the approach does not
cover all of these valuable aspects of health, it
is generally thought to understate the true so-
cietal costs.
The second set of estimates uses less con-
servative values based on the “risk premium”
revealed in labor markets through the higher
wages employers must offer to induce workers
to take jobs with injury. Viscusi compared
wage differences in 24 labor market studies
and found that the extra wages associated with
the increased overall hazard of one death from
risky jobs are between $3 million and $7 mil-
lion (in 1990 dollars). Several regulatory
agencies, such as the FDA, use either Viscusi’s
range of estimates or the $5 million midpoint
when analyzing the benefits of proposed pub-
lic-safety rules. For our second set of cost es-
timates (table 3), we used the $5 million es-
timate, regardless of the age of the patient. We
used both approaches here because economists
have not reached a consensus on which esti-
mates to use, though they may now be leaning
toward the labor market approach.
High Costs of Foodborne Illness: Analysis
Results
We performed cost-of-illness analyses on sev-
en pathogens which are found on some meatBuzby et al.: Measuring Consumer Benejits 79
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Notes: N/A = not applicable. Subtotals and totals may not add due to rounding; totals are rounded down to reflect the
uncertainty of the estimates.
‘ The Landefeld and Seskirr approach is basically a human capital approach, increased by a willingness-to-pay multiplier,
and estimates the cost of a premature death, depending on age, to range from roughly $15,000 to $2,037,000 in 1996
dollars.
bThis labor market approach values the cost of a premature death at $5 million.
‘ Hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) is characterized by kidney failure. HUS following foodborne E. coli O 157:H7
infections causes 44–90 acute illness deaths and 33–62 chronic illness deaths.
dLi.steria monocytogenes includes only hospitalized patients because of data limitations.
c Toxoplasma gorrdii includes only toxoplasmosis cases related to fetuses and newborn children who may become blind
or mentally retarded. Some cases do not have noticeable acute illness at birth, but develop complications by age 17.
Does not include all other cases of toxoplasmosis. Another high-risk group for this parasite is the immunocompromised,
such as patients with AIDS or cancer.
and poultry (i.e., Campylobacter jejuni, Clos- ciated deaths. Using the Landefeld and Seskin
tridium perjYingens, E. coli O 157:H7, Listeria human capital/WTP approach for the cost of
monocytogenes, Salmonella, Staphylococcus a premature death, total annual costs for the
aureus, and Toxoplasma gondii) (table 3). In seven foodborne illnesses and select second-
1996, there were an estimated 3.3 to 12.4 roil- ary complications (in terms of medical costs
lion U.S. cases of the foodborne illnesses from and costs of lost productivity) in 1996 dollars
these seven pathogens, and up to 3,700 asso- ranged between $6.6 billion and $14.5 billion.80 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
Using the $5 million estimate of the cost of a
premature death from the labor market studies
increases total annual costs to between $19.6
billion and $37.1 billion.
Both sets of estimates undervalue the true
costs of foodborne illnesses to society, how-
ever, because the analyses cover only seven of
the more than 40 different foodborne patho-
gens believed to cause human illnesses. Esti-
mated costs would also increase if the costs
for all secondary complications linked to
foodborne illnesses were included. These es-
timates primarily include medical costs and
lost productivity. Total costs would increase if
we include other societal costs, such as pain
and suffering, travel to medical care, and lost
leisure time.
The wide range of costs is largely due to
uncertainty about the true number of annual
foodborne illness cases and associated deaths.
Many people sick with diarrhea do not visit a
doctor, and even if they do, most will not have
a stool culture taken—let alone have the spe-
cific test necessary to identify the pathogen
that caused the illness. The lab test may not
find the pathogens. Even if a particular patho-
gen is implicated, not all culture-confirmed
foodborne illnesses are reported to the CDC,
and these illnesses may not be traced back to
a particulm food source. Therefore, most food-
borne illnesses go unrecorded. Better data
could help narrow the ranges of cases and
deaths, and could provide information to cal-
culate the costs of other foodborne pathogens.
Knowledge on the extent and severity of these
illnesses is still growing, and estimates need
to be updated as better data become available.
Conclusion
This paper has presented examples of how dif-
ferent techniques can be used to evaluate the
costs of foodborne illness and the benefits to
society of increasing the safety of the food
supply. To many economists, contingent val-
uation or experimental economics are pre-
ferred to cost-of-illness studies, since they are
(theoretically) grounded in individual prefer-
ences and measure changes in well-being di-
rectly. However, cost-of-illness methods have
some appeal because they present economic
costs in a straightforward manner easily un-
derstood by decision makers, and they repre-
sent real costs to society (as opposed to hy-
pothetical costs ginned up from synthetic
markets. Both expenditure-based and prefer-
ence-based valuation techniques can play a
role in cost/benefit analyses to better allocate
limited government resources.
In some cases, the choice of valuation
methodology is irrelevant if benefits (or costs)
dominate the costhenefit calculus. In their
study of the benefits of the new HACCP
pathogen reduction rule, Crutchfield et al. used
a sensitivity analysis which calculated the ben-
efits of HACCP using the cost-of-illness ap-
proach. They found the benefits of pathogen
reduction associated with this rule to be be-
tween $1.9 to $171.8 billion over 25 years,
depending upon the choice of valuation for
premature death (Landefeld and Seskin versus
Viscusi) and upon the effectiveness of
HACCP (the degree to which the new rule
would reduce pathogen levels, illness, and
death). The costs of HACCP were put at $1. l–
$1.3 billion over 25 years. Not all public pol-
icy choices are as clear cut as this, of course.
There may be some situations where the ben-
efit/cost calculation will be sensitive to the
valuation methodology, and where choice of
one tool over another may yield a different
conclusion as to the desirability of some pub-
lic policy affecting food safety.
Economics has much to contribute to un-
derstanding food safety issues because of the
nonmarket nature of food safety, the wide ar-
ray of available analytic tools currently being
used by economists, and the need for partici-
pation by economists in multidisciplinary and
interagency food safety research. Economic
analyses can reduce the misallocation of so-
cietal resources by identifying data gaps, pri-
oritizing food safety problems, and estimating
the marginal costs and benefits of alternative
public and private control strategies. Econom-
ic analyses also can identify the distributional
impacts of foodborne illness and control mea-
sures. The cost/benefit requirement ensures
that economics is incorporated into politicalBuzby et al.: Measuring Consumer Benejits 81
decision making and, in turn, provides a
strong demand for economic research.
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